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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses and assesses the track 
record and effectiveness of the so-called 
“Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair 
Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, 
which have emerged as an important instrument 
for crisis prevention and crisis resolution in 
the international ﬁ   nancial system. The paper 
argues that, notwithstanding their low proﬁ  le, 
the Principles which were jointly agreed 
between sovereign debtors and their private 
creditors in 2004 have proved to be an effective 
instrument in spite of their voluntary and non-
binding nature. Indeed, an increasing number 
of sovereign debtors and private creditors have 
adopted the Principles’ recommendations on 
transparency and the timely ﬂ  ow of information, 
close dialogue, “good faith” actions and fair 
treatment. Two elements have been critical to the 
success of the Principles: (i) their speciﬁ  c design 
feature as a soft mode of governance agreed by 
a transnational public-private partnership and 
(ii) the “hardening” after their launch in terms 
of precision and delegation, thus moving them 
somewhat along the continuum of soft law 
and hard law towards the latter. The paper also 
makes the case that the Principles and their 
design features can provide some lessons for the 
current international policy debate on codes of 
conduct in global ﬁ  nancial regulation. 
Keywords: crisis  prevention,  debt 
restructuring, sovereign default, soft law, 
transnational public-private partnership, global 
ﬁ  nancial governance. 
JEL: F34, F51, F53, G15, G18.5
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Strengthening mechanisms for crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution ﬁ  gured prominently on the 
agendas of international institutions and forums 
at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of this 
decade. This focus was triggered by the various 
emerging market crises that had led to protracted 
debt restructuring processes in a number of cases. 
What has crystallised over the past few years as 
an important tool for crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution in the international ﬁ  nancial system is 
an often little-noticed yet innovative soft mode 
of governance, the “Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging 
Markets” (hereafter the “Principles”). Jointly 
established by sovereign debtors and their 
private creditors and investors in autumn 2004, 
the Principles complement the policies and rules 
set by international institutions and forums, 
most notably the International Monetary Fund 
(hereafter IMF or the “Fund”) and the Paris 
Club, as well as the collective action clauses 
contained in international bond contracts. The 
Principles have been operating successfully for 
a few years now and have emerged as a valuable 
component of the international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture. These voluntary and non-binding 
rules, which are the product of a transnational 
public-private partnership (PPP), seek to guide 
and structure cooperative actions of sovereign 
debtors and their private creditors and investors 
both during normal times as well as periods of 
ﬁ  nancial distress. The key goals of the Principles 
are to foster transparency and the timely ﬂ  ow 
of information, close debtor-creditor dialogue, 
“good faith” actions and fair treatment.
In analysing and assessing their creation 
and implementation, this paper ﬁ  nds that the 
Principles provide a useful forum for interaction 
which, by relaxing information constraints and 
promoting mutual trust, fosters collaborative 
approaches. Serving as a focal point that 
facilitates the convergence of the negotiating 
positions of debtors and creditors, they help 
develop a shared understanding and increase 
the predictability of actions of the various 
parties. As a result, the Principles improve 
overall transparency and risk management in 
the global ﬁ  nancial system.
To better understand the Principles’ formula for 
success and to explain why commitment to, and 
compliance with, the Principles is advancing, the 
paper takes a closer look at their speciﬁ  c design 
features and characteristics. It sets out how 
sovereign debtors and their private creditors and 
investors – in the face of the perceived threat of 
government regulation in the area of sovereign 
debt restructuring – managed to agree on the 
Principles as tool of joint governance and in so 
doing resorted to soft law to order their relations. 
Reﬂ   ecting the mutual interests of the parties 
involved, it is this very mode of governance 
and its related beneﬁ  ts that made it possible for 
state and non-state actors to join forces and pull 
together. The paper also shows that since their 
launch in 2004, steps have been taken to ensure 
the continuous usefulness of the Principles 
to sovereign debtors and private creditors by 
adapting them to the evolving interests of the 
parties concerned. More speciﬁ  cally, a change 
in their degree of legalisation has led to a shift 
of the Principles along the continuum of soft 
law and hard law towards the latter. 
Looking at further incentives for sovereign 
debtors to comply with the Principles, the paper 
argues that implementing the Principles can 
usually be expected to be in the self-interest of a 
sovereign debtor if implementation is perceived 
by market participants as a reputation-enhancing 
action, leading to improved capital market 
access. Implementation could also be beneﬁ  cial 
to the debtor in those cases where the negative 
reputational effects of non-implementation, 
and the ensuing impaired standing in capital 
markets, are avoided. 
Going forward, the paper considers a 
number of steps to strengthen further the 
implementation process of the Principles. In 
addition to incorporating the Principles into the 
international policy dialogue, the paper sees 
merit in assessing in more detail the behaviour 
of creditors and investors in the context of 
implementation of the Principles. Moreover, the 6
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issue of communication of information on the 
Principles’ implementation into the marketplace 
is discussed. Taken together, these steps are 
conducive to raising further awareness and 
support for the Principles and anchoring their 
implementation process, thereby helping put the 
Principles on a path towards becoming a market 
standard and increasing the resilience of the 
global ﬁ  nancial system. 
As regards possible lessons that could be drawn 
from the experience with the Principles as a 
successful and effective code of conduct for the 
current international policy debate on global 
ﬁ   nancial regulation, the paper stresses the 
importance of the incentive structure of a code 
as well as the reputational effects associated with 
compliance. Moreover, striking an appropriate 
balance between a code’s generality and its level 
of speciﬁ  city is regarded as crucial. Getting a 
code’s degree of legalisation “right” is a key and 
ongoing challenge that needs to be successfully 
met if a code is to maintain credibility and 
hence its relevance in the governance of the 
international ﬁ  nancial system.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis has led to a wide-
ranging debate on the set-up and functioning of 
the international monetary and ﬁ  nancial system. 
Various rules and regulations are being assessed, 
and the role of state and non-state actors in 
the international system is being scrutinised. 
Moreover, the mandates and formats of 
international institutions and forums, which are 
charged with making the global ﬁ  nancial system 
safer and more resilient to crises and turmoil, 
are subject to discussion.  
The past ﬁ  nancial crises that hit the emerging 
market world for much of the 1980s, 1990s and 
the beginning of this decade also focused 
policymakers’ attention on the functioning of 
the global system and played a pivotal role for 
the re-design of the international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture. What has crystallised over the last 
few years as an important tool for crisis 
prevention and crisis resolution in the 
international ﬁ  nancial system is an often little-
noticed yet innovative – and at the current 
juncture very timely – soft mode of governance, 
the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and 
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets” 
(hereafter the “Principles”), that was 
established jointly by sovereign debtors and 
their private creditors and investors in 
autumn 2004. Complementing the policies and 
rules set by international institutions and 
forums, most notably the International 
Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF or the “Fund”) 
and the Paris Club, as well as the collective 
action clauses contained in international bond 
contracts, the Principles have been operating 
successfully for a few years now and have 
emerged as a valuable component of the 
international  ﬁ   nancial architecture. These 
voluntary non-binding rules, which are the 
product of a transnational 3 public-private 
partnership (PPP), seek to guide and structure 
cooperative actions of sovereign debtors and 
their private creditors and investors both during 
normal times as well as periods of ﬁ  nancial 
distress. The key goals of the Principles are to 
foster transparency and the timely ﬂ  ow  of 
information between debtors and creditors and 
to ensure close debtor-creditor dialogue and 
cooperation to avoid debt restructuring. In 
cases where debt restructuring becomes 
inevitable, the Principles aim to facilitate a 
voluntary restructuring process based on good 
faith and ensure the absence of unfair 
discrimination among affected creditors. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and 
assess the creation and implementation of the 
Principles and to draw some possible lessons 
from the experience gained so far for the 
current policy debate on codes of conduct in 
global  ﬁ   nancial regulation. The paper argues 
that the Principles, although voluntary and 
non-binding in nature, have proved to be an 
effective instrument for crisis prevention and 
crisis resolution that is complied with by an 
increasing number of debtors and creditors. Soft 
modes of governance can hence play a useful 
role in facilitating interactions between various 
actors at the international level and allow for the 
provision of global public goods. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
analyses the development of the Principles in 
the historical context of international policy 
discussions on strengthening the global ﬁ  nancial 
architecture following the various emerging 
market ﬁ  nancial crises of 1997-2002. Further, 
it sets out the main content of the Principles 
Transnational relations are deﬁ   ned as interactions across  3 
national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state actor 
(see Nye/Keohane (1971), p. xii).
“ … We should explore ways to restore emerging and developing countries’ access to credit and 
resume private capital ﬂ  ows which are critical for sustainable growth and development …” 
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington DC, 
15 November 2008.8
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and describes their implementation process. 
Section 3 takes a closer look at the speciﬁ  c 
design features of the Principles and appraises 
them as a product of a transnational PPP. It also 
identiﬁ  es the reasons as to why sovereign debtors 
and their private creditors and investors chose 
a soft mode of governance to organise their 
relations. Next, a set of differentiated criteria 
of legalisation is applied to gain some insight 
into how the Principles have evolved over time 
along the continuum of soft law and hard law. 
Moreover, turning to their implementation, 
the reputational effects for sovereign debtors 
of (non-)compliance with the Principles are 
analysed, and proposals of how to strengthen 
further implementation are presented. Section 4 
looks at possible lessons that could be drawn 
from the experience with the Principles for the 
current international policy debate on codes of 
conduct in global ﬁ   nancial regulation. Some 
concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.9
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2  THE PRINCIPLES FOR STABLE CAPITAL 
FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
IN EMERGING MARKETS
Strengthening mechanisms for crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution ﬁ  gured prominently on the 
agendas of international institutions and forums 
at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of this 
decade. The focus was triggered by the various 
emerging market crises that had led to protracted 
debt restructuring processes in a number of 
cases.4 Indeed, in the face of expanding bond 
ﬁ  nancing by emerging market sovereigns and an 
increasingly spread and diversiﬁ  ed investor base, 
difﬁ   cult sovereign debt restructurings occurred 
because of collective action problems arising 
in the interactions between sovereign debtors 
and their private creditors.5 Concerns grew inter 
alia over successful holdout strategies against 
sovereigns that had already restructured their 
bond debt. Hence, it was the absence of a clear and 
predictable framework in this area that focused 
the international policy debate on approaches 
to ensuring that processes of sovereign debt 
restructuring are predictable and orderly.
2.1  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Two key approaches to avoiding disorderly 
processes of sovereign debt restructuring were 
at the centre of the international policy debates 
that took place at the beginning of this decade.6 
The ﬁ  rst one, the so-called statutory approach, 
was based on an IMF proposal for a “Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM), 
an early version of which was presented 
by Anne Krueger, the IMF’s then First Deputy 
Managing Director, and her staff in late 2001. The 
main idea behind the international bankruptcy 
regime was to allow a qualiﬁ   ed majority of 
creditors to approve a restructuring agreement 
which would be binding on all creditors.7 While 
this approach initially received the backing of 
the international community, it quickly met 
with resistance from various quarters, including 
several emerging market countries, the United 
States and the ﬁ  nancial industry. In the end, at its 
Spring Meetings in 2003, the IMF acknowledged 
that establishing the SDRM at that juncture had 
proven to be infeasible. 
At the same time, a non-statutory or market-
based approach to sovereign debt restructuring 
emerged, consisting of two complementary legs: 
(i) collective action clauses (CACs) included in 
international bond contracts and (ii) the 
Principles. The ﬁ   rst leg of this market-based 
approach is the inclusion of CACs in international 
bond contracts. CACs formulate a set of rules 
applicable to the main decisions of the debt 
restructuring process and constitute a 
decentralised response to collective action 
problems between bond creditors.8 It may be 
recalled that there was not much enthusiasm for 
this concept back in 1996 when the G10 Rey 
Report and its recommendations promoting such 
clauses were released. The changing international 
ﬁ   nancial landscape, however, and experience 
with the debt crises of the 1990s generated 
increasing interest in CACs. The letter that the 
so-called “gang of six” – a coalition of six groups 
representing international investor interests, 
including the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF) – sent to the G7 in May 2002 made it clear 
that the private sector had warmed to the concept 
of CACs.9 Work continued in this area, with the 
G10 Quarles Report as well as the private sector 
developing model clauses. After the Mexican 
See Sturzenegger/Zettelmeyer (2006) for an excellent overview  4 
of recent sovereign debt restructurings.
Potential collective action problems that can occur in the course  5 
of a sovereign debt restructuring process include a “rush to 
the exit” by creditors from the sovereign’s debt and litigation 
initiated by creditors before or after the debt restructuring. 
See Roubini/Setser (2004) for an overview of the various 
potential collective action problems.
An overview of the policy discussions on how to make sovereign  6 
debt restructuring processes more orderly is provided by 
Rieffel (2003) and Helleiner (2009). For an assessment by the 
Banque de France of the development of the Principles, see 
Couillault/Weber (2003) and Weber (2005). The ﬁ  nancial 
industry perspective can be found in IIF (2008a).
See IMF (2003) and Hagan (2005) for further information on the  7 
SDRM and its rationale.
CACs usually include majority restructuring provisions that  8 
allow a required majority of bondholders to agree the terms 
of a restructuring agreement, as well as majority enforcement 
provisions that allow the required majority to prevent a 
minority from initiating litigation during negotiations on debt 
restructuring.
Discussions at that time on establishing the SDRM most probably  9 
resulted in increased support from the private sector for the use 
of CACs. See, e.g. Eichengreen et al. (2003), p. 9.10
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government assumed the role of an icebreaker 
and in February 2003 issued the ﬁ  rst emerging 
market bond under New York law that contained 
a CAC, many other countries followed Mexico’s 
example,10 and today CACs are a standard 
provision in international bonds.11 It is worth 
underlining that, contrary to earlier concerns and 
conﬁ   rmed by empirical evidence, CACs have 
not signiﬁ  cantly affected the price of the bonds 
or the levels of subscription.12 
The Principles are the second leg of the market-
based approach. They were jointly agreed 
between sovereign debtors and private creditors 
in autumn 2004.13 The Principles are voluntary 
and non-binding rules that seek to guide and 
structure cooperative actions of sovereign 
debtors and their private creditors both during 
normal times as well as periods of ﬁ  nancial 
distress. More speciﬁ   cally, they aim to foster 
transparency and the timely ﬂ  ow of information 
between debtors and creditors and to ensure close 
debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to avoid 
restructuring. Further, when debt restructuring 
becomes inevitable, the Principles’ objective 
is to facilitate a voluntary process of debt 
restructuring based on good faith and ensure the 
absence of unfair discrimination among affected 
creditors (see Section 2.2 for a more in-depth 
description of the content of the Principles). As 
far as their design features are concerned, the 
Principles are strictly voluntary, market based 
and applied on a case-by-case basis.
The seed of the Principles was planted in 2001 
when Jean-Claude Trichet, then Governor of the 
Banque de France, ﬂ  oated the idea of devising a 
code of conduct on sovereign debt restructuring, 
to be embraced by the public as well as the private 
sector. He followed up on this idea and made 
an ofﬁ  cial proposal for such a code at the IMF 
Annual Meetings in 2002 (Table 1). Since then, 
efforts were stepped up both on the part of the 
public as well as the private sector, most notably 
the IIF together with other ﬁ  nancial  industry 
associations, to operationalise the concept. 
Among the international institutions and 
forums that have encouraged and supported 
the development of the Principles – and its 
predecessor, the code of conduct – the group 
of G20 ﬁ   nance ministers and central bank 
governors (hereafter G20) stands out as a 
major contributor. The G20 has been closely 
involved in the development of the Principles 
from the start and, thus not surprisingly, ﬁ  rst 
expressed its backing for further work in its 
New Delhi Communiqué in November 2002. 
Two years later in its Berlin Communiqué in 
autumn 2004, the G20 welcomed the Principles 
and conveyed its general support. Since then, 
various communiqués of G20 ﬁ  nance ministers 
and central bank governors have welcomed 
the efforts undertaken by sovereign debtors 
and their private creditors to implement the 
Principles. The well-established and solid 
link between the G20 and the Principles 
is strengthened by the fact that several 
policymakers who represent their countries in 
meetings of G20 ﬁ  nance ministers and central 
bank governors are also members of the Group 
of Trustees of the Principles. 
The IMF has also expressed support for the 
Principles although, like the G10, it was not 
involved in their establishment.14 In several 
of its communiqués, the Fund’s International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) 
stated that it looked forward to the work on 
the code/Principles and encouraged efforts 
to improve them further. Moreover, IMF 
management and senior staff have on various 
occasions welcomed implementation of the 
Principles. An institutional tie has been created 
between the Principles and the Fund since IMF 
representatives attend meetings of the Principles 
One important motivation behind the Mexican Government’s  10 
initiative, apart from pressure from the United States, was 
to avoid the establishment of the SDRM (see quotes from 
Guillermo Ortiz in Helleiner (2009)).
As a result, the share of outstanding emerging market sovereign  11 
bonds including CACs has continued to increase and, according 
to IMF staff estimates, reached at least 66 percent of the total 
outstanding stock of emerging market sovereign bonds in 
August 2007.
See, e.g. IMF (2005), p. 3. 12 
See IIF (2005a). 13 
According to the IMF, it “ 14  has left [the] speciﬁ   cation [of the 
Principles] to sovereign debtors and their creditors, since 
the effectiveness of voluntary rules hinges critically on their 
acceptability to the affected parties” (IMF (2005)).11
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Consultative Group in an observer capacity 
(see Section 2.3 below on the governance 
structure of the Principles’ implementation 
process). 
Finally, the Principles have received the backing 
of Paris Club creditors. At various annual 
meetings between representatives from the 
private sector and Paris Club creditors, the latter 
Table 1 The history of the Principles – from early ideas to final agreement and 
implementation
Year Event
2001 Trichet ﬂ  oated the idea of a code of conduct at a meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee.
2002 Trichet proposed a code of conduct at the IMF Annual Meetings. (September)
In their New Delhi Communiqué, G20 ministers and governors “support further work by the international community, 
in consultation with debtors and creditors, on comprehensive and market compatible approaches to crisis resolution, 
including … a code of good practices”. (November)
2003 In the progress report on implementing the G7 action plan, annexed to the statement of G7 ministers and governors, 
it is noted that “in the light of growing interest in exploring a voluntary ‘code of good conduct’, and since good 
investor relations are key to timely, orderly debt restructurings, we have instructed our ofﬁ  cials to prepare a report, in 
consultation with issuers and the private sector, on these issues by our Fall meeting”. (April) 
In its Communiqué, the IMFC “welcomes recent initiatives to formulate a voluntary code of conduct for debtors and their 
creditors, which will improve the restructuring process, and encourages the IMF to contribute to this work”. (April)
In their Dubai statement, G7 ministers and governors “look forward to further work on the code of conduct …”. (September)
In its Dubai Communiqué, the IMFC “looks forward to the efforts led by sovereign debtors and private creditors to 
develop a voluntary Code of Conduct, and encourages the IMF to continue to contribute to this work”. (September)
In their Morelia Communiqué, G20 ministers and governors, “with a view to promote the development of a workable 
code of conduct, … encourage an inclusive group of issuers and market participants to engage in further discussions, 
with G20 members participating on a voluntary basis”. (October)
2004 In its Communiqué, the IMFC “also encourages sovereign debtors and private creditors to continue their work on a 
voluntary Code of Conduct”. (April)
In its Communiqué, the IMFC “notes recent initiatives aimed at achieving a broad consensus between sovereign issuers 
and their creditors on voluntary principles for emerging markets’ crisis management and debt restructuring”. (October)
Announcement of the Principles (on the eve of the G20 meeting in Berlin). (November)
In their Berlin Communiqué, G20 ministers and governors “welcomed the results achieved between issuing countries and 
private-sector participants on Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets. 
Such principles, which we generally support, provide a good basis for strengthening crisis prevention and enhancing 
predictability of crisis management now, and as they further develop in future”. (November)
2005 In its Communiqué, the IMFC “notes the ‘Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging 
Markets’ being developed by a number of sovereign issuers and the investor community, and encourages further efforts 
to improve the Principles aimed at achieving a broad consensus”. (April)
In its Communiqué, the IMFC “welcomes … the efforts by emerging market issuers and private sector creditors to broaden 
the consensus on the ‘Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”. (September)
In their Xianghe Communiqué, G20 ministers and governors “welcome the efforts by borrowing countries and private-
sector creditors to broaden the consensus on the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in 
Emerging Markets, which could contribute to strengthening crisis prevention and enhancing predictability of crisis 
management”. (October)
2006 Inaugural meeting of the Group of Trustees of the Principles, Singapore. (September)
In their Melbourne Communiqué, G20 ministers and governors “welcomed ongoing efforts by a growing number 
of borrowing countries and private-sector creditors on the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring in Emerging Markets to improve ﬁ   nancial stability and enhance market access of emerging market 
economies”. (November)
2007 Second annual meeting of the Group of Trustees of the Principles, Washington DC. (October)
2008 Third annual meeting of the Group of Trustees of the Principles, Washington DC. (October)12
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reiterated their support for the Principles.15 
Furthermore, as the current Chairman of the 
Paris Club is a member of the Group of Trustees, 
a direct link has been established between the 
Paris Club and the Principles.
2.2  THE CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLES
The Principles rest on four pillars: 
(i) transparency and timely ﬂ  ow of information; 
(ii) close debtor-creditor dialogue and 
cooperation to avoid restructuring; (iii) “good 
faith” actions during debt restructuring and 
(iv) fair treatment of all parties.16
Transparency and timely ﬂ  ow  of    •
information. The Principles call on issuers 
to keep creditors appropriately informed 
about their economic and ﬁ  nancial situation. 
More speciﬁ  c disclosure practices are to be 
implemented in cases of debt restructuring 
where the debtor should also provide more 
detailed information on its external ﬁ  nancial 
obligations and economic policies as well as 
on agreements reached with other creditors, 
the IMF and the Paris Club.   
Close debtor-creditor dialogue and    •
cooperation to avoid restructuring. The 
Principles recommend that a regular dialogue 
be held between debtors and creditors to 
facilitate the ﬂ  ow of information and data 
on economic and ﬁ   nancial policies and 
performance. In this regard, the Principles 
suggest best practices for investor relations 
and see merit in establishing investor relations 
programmes (IRPs). Such IRPs facilitate 
consultation between debtors and creditors on 
market-based approaches to debt-servicing 
problems. Moreover, the Principles urge 
creditors to consider appropriate requests for 
the voluntary and temporary maintenance 
of trade and interbank advances, and/or 
the rollover of short-term maturities on 
public and private sector obligations. In this 
context, commitments by debtors to a strong 
adjustment programme, continued interest 
payments on interbank advances and service 
of other debt are regarded as impacting 
positively on the response by creditors.
Good faith actions   • . In cases of debt 
restructuring, the Principles call on debtors 
and creditors to conduct a restructuring 
process that is voluntary and based on good 
faith. They note that “such a process is based 
on sound policies that seek to establish 
conditions for renewed market access on a 
timely basis, viable macroeconomic growth, 
and balance of payments sustainability in the 
medium term”. During a debt restructuring 
process, the Principles recommend timely 
good faith negotiations by debtors and 
creditors and call upon the IMF to adhere 
to its lending into arrears (LIA) policy that 
requires good faith negotiations to take 
place as a criterion for the Fund to support 
a distressed debtor.17 While the appropriate 
format and role of negotiation vehicles 
such as creditor committees should be 
determined  ﬂ  exibly and on a case-by-case 
basis, negotiations with a creditor committee 
should take place early in the event of 
default. Finally, the Principles urge debtors 
to resume, to the extent feasible, partial debt 
service as a sign of good faith and to resume 
full payment of the principal and interest as 
conditions allow. 
Fair treatment   • . The Principles request 
sovereign debtors to avoid unfair 
discrimination among its creditors. Debtors 
See IIF (2005b, 2006b, 2007c). 15 
See IIF (2005a). 16 
According to this policy, the Fund undertakes lending into  17 
sovereign arrears to private creditors in cases where IMF 
support is considered key for the successful implementation 
of the member’s adjustment programme, and the member is 
pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith effort 
to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors. The IMF’s 
judgement about members’ good faith efforts is guided by the 
following principles. First, when a member has concluded that 
a restructuring of its debt is necessary, it should engage in an 
early dialogue with its creditors, which should continue until 
the restructuring is complete. Second, the member should share 
relevant, non-conﬁ   dential information with all creditors on a 
timely basis. Third, the member should provide creditors with 
an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring 
strategies and the design of individual instruments (IMF (2002)).13
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should therefore seek a rescheduling from 
all ofﬁ  cial bilateral creditors. Credits such 
as short-term trade-related facilities and 
interbank advances should be excluded from 
the restructuring agreement. 
In all, by formulating guidelines to facilitate 
cooperative interactions between sovereign 
debtors and their private creditors, the Principles 
serve as a mechanism for crisis containment 
and resolution and are also relevant for crisis 
prevention. While improved debtor-creditor 
communication and enhanced transparency 
aimed to foster information-sharing are highly 
relevant measures to ensure a predictable 
and orderly debt restructuring process, they 
are equally important in times of ﬁ  nancial 
tranquillity as a ﬁ  rst line of defence against the 
emergence of a debt crisis.
2.3  THE PRINCIPLES’ IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS
While the Principles were announced in autumn 
2004, the process of their implementation started 
only in late 2005 when a light governance 
structure was put in place to assess the extent to 
which the various parties adhere to the Principles. 
The Principles Consultative Group (PCG), which 
currently consists of 24 ﬁ   nance ministry and 
central bank ofﬁ  cials from emerging markets and 
senior representatives of the private ﬁ  nancial 
community, constitutes a key component in this 
process. With technical support from the IIF, the 
PCG considers country cases and provides 
feedback and suggestions to country authorities 
and creditors on how to comply with the 
Principles. The PCG also examines whether the 
Principles remain relevant or require amendment. 
The Group of Trustees of the Principles (GoT), 
meeting once a year in the margins of the IMF 
Annual Meetings, is mandated to provide overall 
guidance for the implementation of the Principles 
and to make proposals for their eventual 
modiﬁ  cation. The GoT is comprised of 30 senior 
leaders in global ﬁ  nance from both the private 
and the public sector and is jointly chaired 
by Jean-Claude Trichet (President of the 
European Central Bank), Henrique de Campos 
Meirelles (Governor of the Banco Central do 
Brasil) and Toshihiko Fukui 18 (former Governor 
of the Bank of Japan) (Chart 1).
He took over from Toyoo Gyohten, former Japanese Vice  18 
Minister for Finance, who held that position until October 2008.
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The current state of implementation of the 
Principles is laid out in the annual reports 
that are prepared by the PCG.19 These reports 
were submitted to the GoT and welcomed, 
though not endorsed, by the latter at its annual 
meetings in autumn 2006, 2007 and 2008 
respectively.20 In its three years of operation, 
the PCG dealt with three main sets of issues. 
First, it reviewed more than a dozen country 
cases with respect to implementation of the 
Principles’ recommendations and engaged in a 
dialogue with country authorities. Second, the 
PCG reﬂ  ected on how it can assess actions by 
creditors in light of the Principles and their crisis 
prevention and crisis resolution aspects. And 
third, it explored how to integrate the Principles 
into the international policy dialogue and the 
marketplace.
(i)    Review of country issues. The PCG 
assessed, and provided feedback to 
the authorities on, the quality and 
effectiveness of country communication 
with investors as well as their data 
provision and transparency. Moreover, it 
reviewed the economic policies of several 
debtor countries and considered some 
debt restructuring issues. The selection 
of countries examined by the PCG is 
determined on the basis of a consultation 
by the IIF with members of the PCG as well 
as other market participants.21 According 
to the implementation reports, the views 
conveyed by the PCG to the country 
authorities met with positive responses in 
a number of cases. Further, the PCG found 
that application of the Principles in the debt 
restructuring and buy-back cases under 
review had promoted the orderly resolution 
of the crises as the authorities and private 
creditors had adopted cooperative, 
transparent and market-based approaches 
(Table 2).22
Among the debt restructuring processes that 
were based on a strategy explicitly aiming 
to be consistent with the Principles was, as 
mentioned in the table above, the one of 
Belize in 2006-07. The authorities had 
engaged their creditors in an open and 
intensive dialogue and ensured transparency 
in the dissemination of economic and 
ﬁ   nancial data and projections. Further, 
Belize had sought guidance from the IMF 
and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) in designing its macroeconomic 
adjustment strategy and received the 
backing of the IMF for its debt exchange 
offer.23 What is noteworthy is that for the 
ﬁ  rst time in more than 70 years collective 
IIF (2006a, 2007d, 2008b). 19 
IIF (2006c, 2007e). 20 
IIF (2007d), p.3. 21 
Until October 2008, the PCG and the GoT did not publish any  22 
of the PCG’s country assessments and discussions with the 
authorities. Country-speciﬁ   c information on implementation 
of the Principles is nevertheless contained in various IIF 
publications, such as the IIF policy letters to the Chairman of 
the IMF’s IMFC and the summaries prepared by the IIF of 
the meetings of private sector representatives with Paris Club 
creditors.
In a letter to the international ﬁ  nancial community, the Managing  23 
Director of the IMF stressed that “high participation by private 
creditors in the debt exchange offer … would help support 
orderly macroeconomic adjustment, restore ﬁ  scal and external 
sustainability, and establish the conditions for strong economic 
growth” (see IMF (2006)).  
Table 2 Implementation of the Principles 
Countries under review  Recommendations
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey   
√  Bolstering investor relations and transparency practices
Hungary    √ Improving  ﬁ  scal reporting and transparency and strengthening 
commitment to sound ﬁ  scal policy
Belize, Congo (Brazzaville), Dominican Republic, Grenada  √  Guiding debt restructurings   
Nicaragua √  Guiding external debt buy-back   
Source: IIF (2006a, 2007a, 2007d, 2008b). 15
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action clauses were used to amend the 
payment terms of a sovereign bond 
governed by New York law. In sum, 
application of the Principles had led to an 
orderly and highly successful debt 
restructuring process – with a high 
participation level of creditors (> 98%) – 
following completion of which Standard & 
Poor’s raised Belize’s credit rating to B 
(see the box below for further information).
A case study of Principles’ implementation: Belize
In the face of signiﬁ  cant  ﬁ   scal and balance of payments ﬁ   nancing gaps, Belize sought a 
cooperative and orderly debt restructuring with its private creditors in 2006. The debt exchange 
offer that was launched on 18 December 2006 and closed on 20 February 2007 resulted in 97% 
of the holders of affected debt exchanging their claims. In the case of one bond where 87.3% 
of holders tendered their claims, restructuring terms were applied to the untendered amounts, 
increasing the ﬁ  nal participation level of the debt restructuring to over 98%.1 As a result, the debt 
restructuring led to a 21% debt reduction in net present value (NPV) terms. The new 22-year 
bond issued by the Belizean authorities, which consolidates most of the external debt owed to 
commercial creditors, has been included in the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global 
(EMBI Global). It is worth highlighting that following the debt exchange, ﬁ  rst, the price of the 
new bond strengthened substantially and, second, Belize experienced an initial slight reduction 
in spreads (see Charts below). 
1  More detailed information on the debt exchange is provided by the IMF in its latest staff report on the 2008 Article IV consultation 
with Belize (see IMF (2008)) and by the law ﬁ  rm advising the Belizean authorities during the process (see Allatt (2007)). See also 
Buchheit/Karpinski (2007). 
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(ii)   Assessment of creditor behaviour.  The 
PCG also devoted attention to how to assess 
actions by creditors and investors in light of 
the Principles. To that end and to ensure that 
the implementation process strike a balance 
between debtor and creditor focus, the PCG 
working group on creditor behaviour was 
set up in late 2006 to determine the extent 
to which risk management and investment 
decisions by creditors and investors are 
guided by the Principles. Moreover, as far 
as the crisis containment and resolution 
aspects of the Principles are concerned, 
the working group – jointly with the IIF 
working group on crisis resolution – has 
provided clariﬁ   cations and suggestions 
for improving a number of elements of 
the Principles, most notably good faith 
negotiations and the role of creditor 
committees in the Principles as well as best 
practice principles for creditor committees. 
As regards the notion of good faith 
negotiations, the PCG working group 
considered whether this concept needed 
to be deﬁ  ned in more precise terms. As 
mentioned previously, although actions 
conducted in good faith are one of the 
four pillars of the Principles, the concept 
has been framed in rather general 
terms and remains somewhat vague.24 
While some observers do see merit in 
the Principles offering more speciﬁ  c 
guidance on good faith negotiations,25 
the PCG working group addressed 
this issue in 2007 and concluded that a 
certain degree of imprecision ought to 
be retained. It noted that it is “neither 
wise nor practical to seek an exhaustive 
set of criteria to evaluate this principle”. 
Rather, it suggests pursuing a pragmatic 
approach whereby “any participant in 
the negotiation process [is] to indicate 
when it believes that actions of another 
party have not been conducted in good 
faith”.26
In its assessment of the role of creditor 
committees under the Principles, the 
working group ﬁ  nds that in some past 
debt restructuring cases, authorities, in 
the view of creditors, have not always 
been in full compliance with the 
Principles. This relates, for instance, to 
the refusal by debtors to negotiate with 
ad hoc creditor committees. While the 
Principles do recommend the use of 
creditor committees when a debtor 
defaults on its debt to private creditors 
and investors, the PCG working group 
sees merit in reﬁ  ning, in the context of 
a possible future update of the 
Principles, the conditions under which 
creditor committees are ﬁ  rst-best 
vehicles for debt restructuring. More 
speciﬁ  cally, in view of the comparability 
of treatment principle,27 a committee 
approach is considered to be preferable 
in cases where a restructuring is 
mandated by the Paris Club.  
The PCG working group developed best 
practice principles for the formation 
and operation of creditor committees, 
which aim to make creditor committees 
more acceptable to issuers and to 
protect the rights of creditors and 
investors. These principles cover a 
number of committee-related issues, 
such as the importance of cooperation 
and trust; the diversity of the creditor 
community; the speed of setting up 
a committee and the signiﬁ  cance  of 
conﬁ  dentiality.   
The Principles call on creditors and debtors to “ 24  engage in a 
restructuring process that is voluntary and based on good 
faith. Such a process is based on sound policies that seek to 
establish conditions for renewed market access on a timely 
basis, viable macroeconomic growth, and balance of payments 
sustainability in the medium term”. The Principles add that 
“debtors and creditors agree that timely good faith negotiations 
are the preferred course of action toward these goals, potentially 
limiting litigation risk”.
See, e.g. Bedford et al. (2005) and Weber (2005). 25 
For an assessment of the concept of good faith as an evolving  26 
norm, see Thomas/García-Fronti (2007).
The comparability of treatment principle of the Paris Club,  27 
seeking to ensure a balanced treatment among all external 
creditors of the debtor country, requires a debtor country to agree 
with both its non-Paris Club sovereign creditors and private 
creditors a rescheduling of its debt on terms comparable to the 
Paris Club’s own agreement. 17
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(iii)    Integration of the Principles into the 
international policy dialogue as well 
as the marketplace. In the view of the 
PCG, consideration could be given to 
fostering relations between the Principles 
and the IMF, e.g. through exploring 
synergies between the PCG’s discussions 
and the Fund’s policy advice, improving 
implementation of the Fund’s data 
standards by providing input in areas that 
are important to investors, and discussing 
the links between the Principles and the 
Fund’s lending into arrears policy. Also, 
thought could be given to exploring further 
the link between the Principles and the Paris 
Club, in particular the comparability of 
treatment principle. Moreover, to increase 
awareness of the Principles and foster 
support, the PCG will consider the extent 
to which those elements of its work that 
are not made public, e.g. its assessments 
and discussions with authorities, could be 
publicly released. The PCG will also look 
into whether there is merit in encouraging 
rating agencies to consider implementation 
of the Principles in their assessment of a 
country’s creditworthiness. 18
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Why have the Principles been successful in 
making the international ﬁ  nancial  system 
more resilient to sovereign debt crises and 
turmoil? How do the Principles differ from 
other attempts at reform? And why is it that 
the Principles have not only survived but even 
progressed as a mechanism for crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution? This section addresses 
these questions by analysing the fundamental 
characteristics that deﬁ  ne the Principles.
More speciﬁ   cally, having considered the 
historical development of the Principles as 
well as their content and current state of 
implementation, the section examines the speciﬁ  c 
design features of the Principles and analyses 
some issues related to their implementation. It 
starts by appraising the Principles as the product 
of a transnational PPP and sheds some light on 
why sovereign debtors and private creditors 
chose a soft mode of governance to order their 
relations. Thereafter, a set of differentiated 
criteria of legalisation is applied to gain insight 
into how the Principles have evolved over time 
in the continuum of soft law and hard law. 
Further, the reputational effects stemming from 
Principles’ (non-)implementation are assessed 
for different types of sovereign debtor. Finally, 
some thought is given to the possible evolution 
of the implementation process going forward.  
3.1  THE PRINCIPLES AS THE PRODUCT OF 
A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP
Transnational PPPs are institutionalised 
arrangements between state and non-state 
actors across national boundaries. They play 
an increasingly important role as tools of 
governance in the global ﬁ  nancial system.28 A 
particular type of this hybrid form of governance 
is co-regulation where state and non-state actors 
are equal partners in creating and implementing 
rules and standards and monitoring compliance.29 
Owing to these features, co-regulation fosters 
ownership of the parties involved and facilitates 
commitment and compliance. The Principles, 
being a joint product of sovereign debtors and 
their private creditors and investors, are a good 
example of the outcome of a transnational 
PPP. It may be noted that, while in the not-too-
distant past state actors used to be the only key 
players in international ﬁ  nancial  rulemaking, 
the emergence of innovative instruments such as 
the Principles conﬁ  rms the relevance of private 
actors in the governance of the global ﬁ  nancial 
system.30 
While a transnational PPP is an attractive 
governance tool for debtors and creditors, a 
broader question relates to the incentives for 
state and non-state actors to join forces in the 
ﬁ   rst place and agree on establishing an 
instrument that serves as a mechanism for crisis 
prevention and resolution, and hence delivers 
the public good of global ﬁ  nancial stability. As 
touched upon previously, looking back at the 
discussions earlier this decade on ways to 
strengthen the international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture, one of the main reasons why 
emerging market sovereign debtors and private 
creditors supported the Principles was the broad 
joint dislike for the statutory approach to 
sovereign debt restructuring in the form of the 
SDRM. Indeed, the shadow of hierarchy or the 
perceived threat of government regulation in the 
area of sovereign debt restructuring helped pave 
the way for the Principles as a speciﬁ  c result of 
joint governance.31 
3.2  THE PRINCIPLES AS A SOFT MODE OF 
GOVERNANCE
Apart from being the product of a transnational 
PPP, the Principles are strictly voluntary and 
See, e.g. Andonova (2006) on the increasing importance  28 
of transnational PPPs and Schäferhoff et al. (2007) for a 
useful survey of the current literature on this speciﬁ  c tool of 
governance.
Co-regulation is one speciﬁ  c type of PPP in the broad continuum  29 
of PPPs. For an overview of the range of different PPPs, 
see Börzel/Risse (2005), p. 200.
An overview of the involvement of the private sector in global  30 
ﬁ  nancial regulation can be found in Mosley (2005) and Drezner 
(2007). 
The shadow of hierarchy, i.e. legislative threats or incentives,  31 
may indeed serve as a catalyst for successful interactions between 
private and public actors, as argued, e.g. by Börzel/Risse (2005). 19
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non-binding guidelines and thus represent 
not a mandatory approach, but a soft mode 
of governance. This broad classiﬁ  cation is in 
line with standard analyses of institutional 
arrangements and their features, which are 
usually based on a binary distinction between 
soft (non-binding) and hard (binding) law.32 Such 
a simple binary classiﬁ  cation is not sufﬁ  cient, 
however, to allow for a more detailed analysis 
as to why sovereign debtors and their private 
creditors and investors opted for the Principles 
as a very speciﬁ  c mode of governance to order 
their relations and to complement the policies 
and rules set by international institutions and 
forums in the area of crisis prevention and 
crisis resolution. For this reason, and to explore 
how the Principles have evolved over the last 
few years, some more ﬁ  nely  differentiated 
assessment criteria are required. 
A useful framework that permits a more nuanced 
perspective on the intermediate forms of soft and 
hard law is the concept of legalisation developed 
by Abbott et al. (2000) who classify soft law and 
hard law along a continuum of three independent 
dimensions of governance, namely obligation, 
precision and delegation. The dimension of 
obligation relates to the extent to which rule(s) 
and commitment(s) bind actors, ranging from 
non-legal norms on one end of the spectrum to 
legally binding rules on the other. With regard to 
the second dimension of legalisation, a rule that 
is precise spells out clearly and unambiguously 
objectives and instruments, with the two extreme 
forms being vague principles and precise, 
highly elaborated rules. The third dimension of 
legalisation pertains to the degree of authority 
that is delegated to third parties to implement 
agreements, provide dispute resolution and 
make rules. Delegated authority can vary from 
diplomacy, where the degree of delegation is 
lowest, to international organisations and courts, 
reﬂ   ecting a high level of delegation. Taking 
these three dimensions together, Abbott et al. 
provide useful deﬁ  nitions of hard law and soft 
law: an institutional arrangement is considered 
to be hard law if it is characterised by legally 
binding obligations that are precise and by a 
delegated authority in charge of interpreting and 
implementing the law. A softening of law occurs 
when one or more of the three above-mentioned 
dimensions of governance are weakened.
Looking at the design features of the Principles 
through the lens of this framework, we proceed 
in two steps. First, we seek to identify the 
reasons as to why sovereign debtors and their 
private creditors and investors chose the speciﬁ  c 
legalised arrangement of the Principles. Second, 
we assess the evolution of the Principles in the 
continuum of soft and hard law.
3.2.1 THE BENEFITS OF THE SOFT LAW NATURE 
OF THE PRINCIPLES
To shed some light on the motivation behind the 
soft mode of governance of the Principles as one 
of their speciﬁ  c design features, it is useful to 
turn to the literature on international relations/
international law, which highlights a number of 
beneﬁ  ts associated with soft law.33 Among the 
key advantages identiﬁ  ed are lower negotiating 
or contracting costs, limited sovereignty costs, 
its role as tool of compromise, the way soft law 
deals with uncertainty, and improved information 
ﬂ  ows. These beneﬁ  ts are also relevant in the 
context of the Principles and are reviewed in 
turn.
Lower negotiating/contracting costs   • . Soft 
law, deﬁ   ned along the above-mentioned 
three dimensions of obligation, precision 
and delegation, facilitates cooperative 
agreements between different parties as it 
entails limited contracting costs and implies 
lower stakes for the parties involved. Looking 
at the Principles, the realm of soft law has 
indeed catalysed successful negotiations and 
interactions between sovereign debtors and 
private creditors and investors. 
Lower sovereignty costs   • . The institutional 
devices of soft law such as non-binding 
obligations, imprecise commitments and the 
absence of extensive delegation of powers 
promote cooperation and limit the sovereignty 
See Friedrich (2008) for a more in-depth analysis of codes of  32 
conduct. 
See, e.g. Abbott/Snidal (2000) as well as Trubek et al. (2006). 33 20
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costs to the parties involved. In the context of 
the Principles, agreeing on a soft institutional 
arrangement reﬂ   ected the interests of both 
debtors and creditors as they sought to avoid 
the perceived undesirable effects of a hard 
law solution in the form of the SDRM. 
Tool of compromise   • . With actors’ 
preferences usually diverging on some of the 
issues under negotiation, soft legalisation 
constitutes an effective tool of compromise 
that allows the various parties to align 
commitments with their respective interests. 
In the case of the Principles, agreement was 
reached despite the fact that the preferences 
of debtors and creditors were naturally not 
congruent in all aspects of crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution.
Coping with uncertainty   • . In dealing with the 
exigencies of uncertainty, the non-binding 
nature of soft law affords greater ﬂ  exibility 
when agreeing on modiﬁ   cations to the 
institutional arrangement as circumstances 
change. Moreover, in the absence of 
precise standards on certain elements of a 
potential agreement, a soft law approach 
can be seen as preferable since it fosters 
cooperation. The soft law character of the 
Principles enabled agreement to be reached 
on clariﬁ  cations and complements without 
formal legal changes (see the following 
section on how the Principles have evolved 
over the last few years). Moreover, the soft 
form of legalisation has proved useful given 
that some aspects of the Principles, such as 
the notion of good faith negotiations, are not 
deﬁ  ned in precise terms.  
Improved information ﬂ  ows   • . The use of soft 
legal instruments helps improve the ﬂ  ow of 
information between the various actors and 
enhances transparency. This is conﬁ  rmed by 
the Principles and their governance structure, 
which provide debtors and creditors with a 
useful mechanism and forum for interaction 
to develop shared ideas, build trust and 
foster mutual learning from each other’s 
experience.
In sum, by using soft law as the mode of 
legalising their relations, sovereign debtors and 
their private creditors and investors managed to 
agree on the Principles as a joint institutional 
approach to crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution. It is this speciﬁ  c design feature of the 
Principles that reﬂ  ects the mutual interests of the 
various parties involved and hence facilitated 
agreement.
3.2.2 THE CHANGING DEGREE OF LEGALISATION 
OF THE PRINCIPLES
While the main body of the Principles has 
remained unchanged since its publication in 
spring 2005, a number of clariﬁ  cations  and 
complements have been agreed over the last 
few years. These pertain in particular to the role 
of creditor committees and the implementation 
process of the Principles. The framework created 
by Abbott et al. is a useful tool to assess these 
developments in light of the three dimensions 
of obligation, precision and delegation and to 
provide some insight into how the Principles 
have evolved in the continuum of soft and hard 
law. 
As far as the level of obligation of the Principles 
is concerned, the assessment is simple since no 
changes have been made or suggested, meaning 
that this dimension of legalisation has remained 
unaltered: the Principles continue to be 
voluntary guidelines that are not legally binding 
(see Chart 2 for an overview). 
With regard to the Principles’ degree of 
precision, some clariﬁ  cations and complements 
have been agreed that relate to the role of 
creditor committees. As mentioned previously, 
the best practice principles for the formation and 
operation of creditor committees that were 
agreed in 2007 provide operational guidance on 
a number of aspects. These relate to the notion 
of cooperation and trust, the diversity of the 
creditor community, the speed of setting up a 
committee and the signiﬁ  cance of conﬁ  dentiality. 
Taken together, these clariﬁ  cations can be seen 
as a “hardening” of the Principles along the 
dimension of precision. A hardening would 
obviously also occur if agreement were reached 21
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on the need to establish creditor committees  34 in 
non-default cases where a restructuring is 
mandated by the Paris Club or if a more precise 
deﬁ   nition of the concept of good faith 
negotiations were agreed. 
As concerns the level of delegation of the 
Principles, some signiﬁ  cant  changes  took 
place in late 2005 when the establishment 
of a light governance structure and the 
delegation of authority to the PCG and the 
GoT marked the beginning of the Principles’ 
implementation process. Until that point in 
time, there had been no mechanism in place to 
monitor implementation of, and compliance 
with, the Principles. As far as the assessments 
As was mentioned in Section 2.3, the Principles already provide  34 
a certain degree of precision with regard to creditor committees 
as they recommend the latter’s use in cases where a debtor 
defaults on its debt to private creditors and investors.
Chart 2 The evolution of the Principles in the continuum of soft and hard law
agreed clarifications/complements
suggested clarifications/complements
status quo as at October 2008 
LOW           HIGH
OBLIGATION
“… the Principles should be 
applied flexibly on a case-by-case 
basis, and are strictly voluntary. 
Accordingly, no party is legally 
bound by any of the provisions …” 
(2004 Principles)
PRECISION
Role of creditor 
committees:
negotiations with a 
creditor committee 
should take place 
in default cases
(2004 Principles)
No precise definition 
of good faith
(2004 Principles; 
confirmed in 2007 
PCG report)
Best practice principles 
for creditor committees 
(2007 PCG report)
Creditor committees 
also in non-default 
cases where a 
restructuring is
mandated by 



















structure (GoT/ PCG) 
since late 2005 
Publication of selected 
PCG work 
(2008 PCG report) 
Source: Author’s compilation; classiﬁ  cation based on Abbott et al. (2000).22
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by the PCG and its discussions with country 
authorities are concerned, in the ﬁ  rst two years 
of implementation the parties to the Principles 
took the view that country-speciﬁ  c information 
would not be made public. This approach was 
changed in the third year of implementation 
when it was agreed that selected parts of the 
PCG assessments of a subset of the countries 
under review should be publicised. In sum, 
these agreed changes can be interpreted as a 
hardening of the Principles along the dimension 
of delegation. Any widening of this publication 
policy would of course imply a further 
hardening of the Principles. Also, weaving 
the Principles into the international policy 
dialogue and/or encouraging rating agencies to 
consider implementation of the Principles in 
their assessments of countries’ creditworthiness 
would reduce their degree of softness. 
In conclusion, any assessment of the evolution 
of the Principles that is solely based on a 
simple binary distinction between non-binding 
and binding law – hence looking only at their 
unchanged dimension of obligation – would be 
misleading as it would erroneously suggest that 
the overall degree of legalisation of the Principles 
has not changed. A richer and more nuanced 
appraisal is only possible if one moves beyond 
a one-dimensional assessment and considers 
also the dimensions of precision and delegation. 
Doing so reveals that since their launch in 2004, 
the Principles have in fact been hardened in 
terms of their precision and delegation and have 
thus shifted somewhat along the continuum of 
soft law and hard law towards the latter.
3.3  (NON-)IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLES AND THE REPUTATIONAL 
EFFECTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS
We observe that an increasing number of 
sovereign debtors and private creditors are 
implementing the Principles and acting in line 
with their recommendations. As mentioned 
previously, a key initial motivation for debtors 
and creditors to support this non-statutory or 
market-based approach, and hence the emergence 
of the CACs-cum-Principles framework, was 
to prevent the establishment of the SDRM that 
was generally seen to be non-desirable. As the 
Principles’ implementation process advances, 
another motivation for sovereign debtors to 
subscribe to this mechanism is emerging, 
namely the signalling and reputational effects 
stemming from commitment and compliance. 
Indeed, signing up to and implementing the 
Principles is increasingly being regarded as a 
positive and credible signal to the international 
ﬁ  nancial community that the respective debtor 
behaves as a responsible actor. 
To explore in more detail the potential 
reputational effects associated with 
implementation of the Principles, we use the 
classiﬁ  cation of reputation of debtor countries 
developed by Tomz (2007). According to Tomz, 
creditors and investors hold beliefs about 
whether a sovereign debtor will repay or default 
on its debt. These beliefs are formed on the basis 
of the information available to creditors and – 
irrespective of whether they correctly or 
incorrectly reﬂ  ect the preferences of the debtor – 
represent the reputation of the debtor in ﬁ  nancial 
markets and give rise to three types of debtor. 
Type I debtors are seen as having a strong 
preference for debt repayment and repay their 
debt regardless of whether conditions are 
favourable or adverse; type II debtors have the 
reputation of repaying in good times but not in 
bad times and type III debtors are expected to 
default in bad times and sometimes also in good 
times.35 The reputation of a sovereign debtor, 
and hence its access to capital markets, changes 
if it acts contrary to its perceived type.
To use this reasoning in the context of the 
Principles, we adopt Tomz’s categories of 
debtors but, while Tomz distinguishes between 
“repaying” and “defaulting” on external debt 
as the two actions that debtors can pursue, we 
differentiate between “implementing” and “not 
implementing” the Principles. Applying Tomz’s 
framework allows for an assessment of the 
reputational effects of (non-)implementation 
For further details on this classiﬁ   cation and its relation to  35 
reputation, see Tomz (2007), pp. 16.23
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of the Principles depending on the type of 
debtor. A type I debtor who does not implement 
the Principles and whose actions are thus 
not in line with these guidelines will suffer a 
reputational loss that has an adverse bearing 
on its access to international capital markets. 
The same behaviour by a type III debtor will 
not have any reputational effect since this 
debtor acts as expected. Reputational gains, 
and thus improved access to capital markets, 
can be reaped by a type III debtor as well as a 
type II debtor in adverse conditions since these 
debtors, by implementing the Principles and 
hence pursuing a cooperative approach to crisis 
prevention and crisis resolution, take investors 
by surprise (Chart 3 provides an overview of 
the reputational changes induced by Principles’ 
(non-)implementation).
What are the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this analysis? First, implementing the Principles 
can usually be expected to be in the self-interest 
of a sovereign debtor if implementation is 
perceived by market participants as a reputation-
enhancing action, leading to improved capital 
market access. Second, implementation is 
also beneﬁ   cial to the debtor in those cases 
where the negative reputational effects of non-
implementation, and the ensuing impaired 
standing in capital markets, are avoided. In 
any case, private creditors and investors play 
an important role in advancing implementation 
of the Principles to the extent that they provide 
sovereign debtors with relevant reputational 
rewards and penalties.36 
3.4  STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS OF THE PRINCIPLES
The Principles will continue to be a useful 
component of the international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture owing to the relevance of private 
external creditors and their role in providing 
ﬁ   nancing to emerging and developing 
economies. Indeed, in 2007 these countries in 
aggregate owed more than 50 percent of their 
long-run external debt to private creditors.37 
Since “blue sky conditions” in ﬁ  nancial markets 
cannot be taken for granted and the global 
ﬁ  nancial environment invariably changes over 
time, it is imperative to have in place sound 
mechanisms for crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution. To strengthen further the Principles’ 
implementation process, a number of measures 
could be considered. First, it could be examined 
how to incorporate the Principles into the 
international policy dialogue by strengthening 
the links between the GoT/PCG and international 
policy forums and multilateral ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Second, more attention could be 
devoted to creditors and investors and their 
behaviour in the context of Principles’ 
implementation. Finally, thought could be given 
on how to convey more information on the 
Principles and their implementation to the 
marketplace. Chart 4 provides an overview of 
these various measures.
On the role of the private sector in fostering standards compliance  36 
by countries, see Vojta/Uzan (2003).
See World Bank (2008). 37 
Chart 3 (Non-)implementation of the Principles and changes in reputation of a sovereign 
debtor
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A  ﬁ   rst set of measures to strengthen the 
implementation process of the Principles 
pertains to the relations between the Principles 
and international forums and organisations. In 
this regard, relations with the G20, the Paris 
Club and the IMF are of particular relevance. 
There is clear merit in continued interaction 
between members of the Group of Trustees 
and the PCG and the Group of Twenty ﬁ  nance 
ministers and central bank governors given the 
latter’s prominent role in the formation and 
implementation of the Principles. Events and 
conferences organised jointly by the GoT and 
the G20, such as the roundtables on international 
capital markets and emerging markets in 
April 2008 and 2009, are a useful way to raise 
further awareness of the Principles and enhance 
discussion on their implementation. 
As far as links between the Principles and the 
Paris Club are concerned, initiating direct 
interactions between the Club and the bodies 
in charge of the Principles’ implementation 
process could be useful if they focus on 
synergies between the Principles and the 
policies of the Club, identify areas of common 
interest and deepen mutual understanding. 
With Club creditors having expressed support 
for the Principles at their regular meetings 
with private sector representatives, an issue 
that could be explored further, and that is also 
mentioned in the PCG reports, is the relation 
between the Principles and the Club’s principle 
of comparability of treatment. An exchange of 
views could be valuable since application of 
this principle has a bearing on the negotiations 
between the sovereign debtor and its private 
creditors. Another topic that is worth addressing 
is the recent practice by some non-Paris Club 
creditors of selling their claims on heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC) to private sector 
participants who then seek to fully recover these 
claims through legal action.38
Moreover, deepening the links between the 
GoT/PCG and the IMF would also be 
advantageous.39 While IMF representatives 
already attend meetings of the PCG in an 
observer capacity, it could be considered to 
strengthen relations and seek more actively the 
cooperation of the Fund in implementing the 
Principles. One area on which dialogue could be 
sought – and which is also mentioned in the 
PCG reports – is the IMF’s lending into arrears 
policy. The way the Fund applies this policy has 
an important impact on negotiations between a 
sovereign debtor and its private creditors and, as 
the IMF is likely to review its LIA policy at 
some stage, the PCG could be a useful forum 
See Paris Club (2007). 38 
For an assessment of the various elements of the Principles from  39 
an IMF perspective, see IMF (2005).
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for participants to express their views on issues 
such as how the Fund speciﬁ  es  the  ﬁ  nancial 
parameters for a debt restructuring and how the 
good faith criterion is applied. 
A second way to foster the implementation 
process of the Principles is to devote more 
attention to creditors and investors and their 
behaviour in the context of the Principles. As 
was mentioned in Section 2.3, the purpose of 
the PCG working group on creditor behaviour 
is precisely to look into this area. It seeks 
to develop methods for assessing the extent 
to which risk management and investment 
decisions by creditors and investors are guided 
by the Principles. Moreover, this working group, 
jointly with the IIF working group on crisis 
resolution, has produced best practices for the 
formation and operation of creditor committees. 
Efforts in this ﬁ  eld could be stepped up further, 
and it is therefore welcome that the PCG in the 
future intends to review actions by creditors 
and investors. Such reviews could also usefully 
include the latter’s adherence to key standards 
and codes. Doing so will not only broaden the 
implementation process, but will also help 
ensure a symmetric treatment of debtors and 
creditors/investors.
A third way that could be explored to strengthen 
the implementation process of the Principles 
relates to the communication of information on 
implementation to the marketplace. As 
previously discussed, only selected work and 
assessments of the PCG are made public, and it 
has therefore been suggested that the GoT and 
PCG publicise a list of debtor countries as well 
as of investors and creditors that subscribe to 
the Principles and implement their guidelines. 
More far-reaching suggestions would be to 
publish all PCG assessments or to encourage 
rating agencies to take information on (non-)
implementation into account when gauging a 
country’s creditworthiness. How should these 
ideas be judged? Those in favour cite the 
experience with publishing information on 
compliance with voluntary international 
standards and codes, such as the Fund’s Special 
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), which 
shows that subscribing countries are able to reap 
beneﬁ   ts in terms of lower borrowing costs.40 
Moreover, according to proponents, conveying 
information to the marketplace would also help 
increase peer pressure as well as market pressure 
on debtors, creditors and investors to comply 
with the Principles. If one were to follow this 
logic, there would seem to be merit in the GoT 
and PCG publishing all information on the 
implementation process. At the same time, 
caution is necessary as to the selection of 
information to be published, for two reasons at 
least. First, as we have seen, several elements of 
the Principles are phrased in rather vague terms. 
As a result, assessing compliance is not a simple 
matter, but requires inevitably a certain degree 
of judgement on the part of the PCG. Second, as 
to the PCG’s reviews of the economic policies 
of debtor countries, these assessments may at 
times deviate in some respect from those 
prepared by the IMF. Publication may therefore 
entail the potential risk of confusing market 
participants, in particular in times of ﬁ  nancial 
stress. That said, the PCG is of course not the 
only channel through which information on 
compliance with the Principles can be 
communicated to the marketplace. Indeed, 
debtors and creditors themselves are free to do 
so – the release of information by the Belizean 
authorities in the course of their debt 
restructuring is a case in point. 
See, e.g. the empirical studies by Cady (2004), Christoﬁ  des et al.  40 
(2003) and Glennerster/Yongseok (2003).26
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FOR THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE ON 
CODES OF CONDUCT IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION
Codes of conduct – be they developed by state 
actors, non-state actors or jointly by state and 
non-state actors – play a relevant role in the 
ongoing discussions on ways to strengthen the 
functioning of the global ﬁ  nancial system. As 
far as initiatives by the public sector are 
concerned, while the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) continues its work on best practices 
for countries that receive cross-border 
investments from sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs), the International Working Group on 
SWFs presented its best practices for these 
funds in October 2008. The ﬁ  nancial industry, 
e.g. the Institute of International Finance and 
the Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group (CRMPG III), has released its proposals 
for best practices.41
The various codes of conduct that are currently 
being established differ of course in many 
respects. The differences relate in particular 
to the actors involved in the creation of these 
codes as well as to their scope and the relevant 
addressees. The efforts of the ﬁ  nancial industry 
can be classiﬁ   ed as private self-regulation 
in the shadow of hierarchy that focus on 
recommendations for non-state actors such 
as commercial banks and hedge funds. By 
comparison, the initiatives by international 
organisations and governments with regard 
to SWFs are an example of public regulation 
targeted at state actors. In the case of the 
Principles, it is public-private co-regulation 
which seeks to guide and structure the behaviour 
of state and non-state actors.
Despite all of these differences, codes of conduct 
face the same key questions, namely how to 
foster their effectiveness despite their voluntary 
non-binding nature and how to reconcile general 
guidelines with the necessary speciﬁ  city. 
A number of observers express doubts about 
the potential of non-binding codes to effectively 
inﬂ  uence the actions of their addressees and to 
trigger changes in behaviour that would not also 
take place in the absence of a code. Moreover, 
it is at times maintained that owing to their 
general nature, codes lack the speciﬁ  c guiding 
force that is indispensable to meaningfully steer 
the behaviour of state and non-state actors. 
In response to these concerns, it is worth recalling 
the experience with the Principles since, as we 
have seen, they have proved to be a successful 
and effective code of conduct in spite of their 
voluntary and non-binding nature. While not 
claiming that the speciﬁ  c design characteristics 
of the Principles are a silver bullet and can be 
copied in toto, their features can nevertheless 
provide some lessons when it comes to devising 
codes of conduct in international ﬁ  nancial 
regulation.  
One lesson that can be drawn is that a code 
of conduct will only be complied with if the 
addressees of the code regard it as being in 
their self-interest. As can be derived from 
experience with the Principles, with actors 
applying cost-beneﬁ   t analyses when making 
a decision as to whether or not to abide by a 
voluntary non-binding code, it is crucial for 
the designers of such an instrument to ensure 
that the reputational effects associated with 
(non-)compliance are of sufﬁ  cient  size. 
Moreover, the shadow of hierarchy is a 
signiﬁ   cant determinant encouraging actors to 
comply as they seek to avoid public regulation 
in the form of mandatory binding law. In any 
event, what appears to be a sine qua non in 
the absence of legally binding obligations is a 
mechanism through which actors’ compliance 
with a code of conduct can be monitored or, 
using the terminology of the concept of modes of 
legalisation applied earlier, agreement on some 
“hardening” along the dimension of delegation. 
Another lesson provided by the Principles 
relates to the issue of how to reconcile a code’s 
general guidelines with the necessary speciﬁ  city. 
These latter initiatives by private sector bodies have been  41 
welcomed by the Financial Stability Forum which regards them 
as consistent with and complementary to its efforts (see Financial 
Stability Forum, 2008).27
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As we have seen, a code of conduct can usefully 
be adjusted over time by hardening it along 
the dimension of precision once experience 
is gained in its application. In so doing, an 
appropriate balance can be struck between 
the two competing features of generality and 
speciﬁ  city. 
In sum, the designers of codes of conduct in 
global  ﬁ   nancial governance face the difﬁ  cult, 
albeit not intractable, task of ﬁ  nding an issue 
area-speciﬁ   c combination of dimensions of 
legalisation that reﬂ   ects the interests of the 
creators and addressees of the code. In the 
end, state actors need to determine whether a 
code is sufﬁ  ciently ambitious both in terms of 
its substance as well as its overall degree of 
legalisation or whether further steps in the form 
of mandatory binding law need to be taken. Once 
a code is established, its designers ought not to 
treat the position of the code in the continuum of 
soft law and hard law as permanently ﬁ  xed. They 
should instead adapt it in light of the experience 
gained in its implementation and in view of a 
changing global ﬁ  nancial environment.  28
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The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair 
Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, which 
have been jointly agreed between sovereign 
debtors and their private creditors, have proved 
to be an effective instrument for crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution in the international ﬁ  nancial 
system. While a systematic assessment of the 
role of the Principles is only feasible once more 
experience is gained with their implementation, 
it is noteworthy that three years into the 
implementation process of the Principles an 
increasing number of sovereign debtors and 
private creditors act in line with their voluntary 
and non-binding recommendations. The 
Principles, which complement the policies and 
rules set by international institutions and forums 
as well as the CACs in international bond 
contracts, provide a useful forum for interaction 
that, by relaxing information constraints and 
promoting mutual trust, fosters collaborative 
approaches. Serving as a focal point that 
facilitates the convergence of the negotiating 
positions of debtors and creditors, they help 
develop a shared understanding and increase the 
predictability of actions of the various parties. As 
a result, the Principles contribute to improving 
overall transparency and risk management in 
the global ﬁ  nancial system.
What is the Principles’ formula for success and 
why is it that commitment to, and compliance 
with, the Principles is advancing? To answer 
these questions, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at their speciﬁ   c design features 
and characteristics. As we have described, 
sovereign debtors and their private creditors 
and investors – in the face of the perceived 
threat of government regulation in the area of 
sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. the creation of 
the SDRM – managed to agree on the Principles 
as tool of joint governance and in so doing 
resorted to soft law to order their relations. 
Reﬂ  ecting the mutual interests of the parties 
involved, it is this very mode of governance 
and its related beneﬁ  ts that made it possible for 
state and non-state actors to join forces and pull 
together. Moreover, since their launch in 2004, 
steps have been taken to ensure the continuous 
usefulness of the Principles to sovereign debtors 
and private creditors by adapting them to the 
evolving interests of the parties concerned. As 
the application of a set of differentiated criteria 
of legalisation has shown, the Principles have 
been modiﬁ  ed in terms of their precision and 
delegation, while their level of obligation 
has remained unaltered. This change in the 
combination of the dimensions of legalisation 
has led to a shift of the Principles along the 
continuum of soft law and hard law towards 
the latter. The committed parties hence do not 
take a Panglossian view of the Principles and 
their current state of implementation: a further 
ﬁ   ne-tuning of their degree of legalisation 
may well take place. In any case, progress in 
implementing the Principles makes it hard to 
deny the effectiveness of soft law, proving 
wrong those observers who regard hard law 
per se as the superior mode of governance.
Looking at further incentives for sovereign 
debtors to comply with the Principles, we have 
argued that implementing the Principles can 
usually be expected to be in the self-interest of a 
sovereign debtor if implementation is perceived 
by market participants as a reputation-enhancing 
action, leading to improved capital market 
access. Implementation could also be beneﬁ  cial 
to the debtor in those cases where the negative 
reputational effects of non-implementation, 
and the ensuing impaired standing in capital 
markets, are avoided. 
Going forward, a number of steps have 
been discussed to strengthen further the 
implementation process of the Principles. 
First, there is clear merit in incorporating the 
Principles into the international policy dialogue 
by strengthening the links between the GoT/
PCG with international policy forums and 
multilateral ﬁ  nancial institutions. Second, further 
investigation into the behaviour of creditors 
and investors in the context of implementation 
of the Principles is useful, not least to ensure 
a symmetric implementation process. As 
far as communication of information on 
Principles’ implementation to the marketplace 29
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REMARKS is concerned, we have argued that, while 
publishing information is desirable, selecting 
the information to be published requires 
some caution. At the same time, individual 
debtors and creditors are of course free to 
decide whether and to what extent they wish 
to publicise information on their compliance 
with the Principles. Taken together, these steps 
are conducive to raising further awareness and 
support for the Principles and anchoring their 
implementation process, thereby helping put the 
Principles on a path towards becoming a market 
standard and increasing the resilience of the 
global ﬁ  nancial system. 
As regards possible lessons that could be 
drawn from the experience with the Principles 
as a successful and effective code of conduct 
for the current international policy debate on 
global ﬁ  nancial regulation, we have argued that 
the incentive structure of a code as well as the 
reputational effects associated with compliance 
are important elements that should be borne in 
mind when designing such a tool. Moreover, we 
have made the case that it is crucial to strike an 
appropriate balance between a code’s generality 
and its degree of speciﬁ   city. As there is no 
blueprint for an optimal design of a code of 
conduct, getting the combination of obligation, 
precision and delegation “right” is a key 
challenge both when establishing the code as 
well as during its implementation phase. Only 
if this ongoing challenge is successfully met 
will the code maintain credibility and hence its 
relevance in the governance of the international 
ﬁ  nancial system. 30
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